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From the Editor
In This Issue . . .
This journal has always been recognized for airing differing views on
many of the issues impacting American life in general and the nation’s military
in particular. The current issue is certainly reflective of that charter. Travis
Sharp leads off with his thoughtful analysis of a proposal currently being discussed in the halls of Congress and the offices of various security experts; allocating the annual defense budget as a specific percentage of the gross domestic
product (GDP). In “Tying US Defense Spending to GDP: Bad Logic, Bad Policy” the author summarizes the arguments advanced by advocates of this strategy to conclude that although calculating defense spending according to GDP
may resonate rhetorically and politically it should be rejected as a legitimate
policy option. Sharp acknowledges that even though GDP is one of the important metrics for determining defense spending, it fails to provide any insight into
how much should be spent in a given period. He closes with the warning that pursuing such a policy would avoid the difficult apportionment choices required in
today’s volatile and uncertain world.
Controversy and contending ideas are the grist on which editors thrive.
Certainly, there has been no greater controversy in recent military memory than
the one associated with effects-based operations (EBO). In fact, the journal has
been inundated with manuscripts touting the pros and cons of this concept. At the
heart of the conundrum is General James N. Mattis’s guidance to the US Joint
Forces Command (USJFCOM) staff on how EBO, NATO’s effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), operational net assessment (ONA), and systemof-systems analysis (SoSA) would be utilized (or not) in future force development,
training, and experimentation. It seemed only just that we draw on the original
source of the argument, and thanks to our good friends at Joint Force Quarterly
(JFQ) we were able to do just that. For the first time in more than 11 years we are
reprinting an article. Leading our thematic feature “The Future of Effects-based
Operations” is General Mattis’s article that originally appeared in the 4th Quarter
of 2008 issue of JFQ, “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations.” The accompanying counterpoint, “Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever,” is authored by Colonel Tomislav Z. Ruby from the US Air
Force. Ruby espouses the belief that General Mattis’s memorandum not only fails
to put the EBO issue to rest, it reinvigorates the debate. He concludes that rather
than abandoning the concept, USJFCOM should move to create an organizational
culture that champions the cause of EBO.
Nader Elhefnawy investigates the risks associated with the increased
use of nuclear energy to offset world dependence on fossil fuels in “The Next
Wave of Nuclear Proliferation.” The author bases his thesis on an examination
of the form this expanded use of nuclear energy might take; what this increase
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will mean for the distribution of materials and technology; and the accompanying threats to security. Elhefnawy believes that any substantial increase in the
use of nuclear energy to offset shortfalls in fossil fuels will, by the middle of this
century, possibly tax the nonproliferation regime’s surveillance and enforcement mechanisms beyond the breaking point.
In “A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World” Michael Lind
develops a thesis based on the belief that the United States is a superpower in
search of a grand strategy. Readers will be struck by the author’s assertion that
this philosophical void is having a detrimental impact on the structure and purpose of the US military. He warns against America’s pursuit of its current strategy of “US hegemony” or the suggested alternatives of “neoisolationism” and
“offshore balancing.” The author advocates a “concert-balance” strategy that
does not require America to be the sole counter to the world’s aggressors, relying instead on a concert or alliance of nations. Inherent in this new strategy is the
rejection of the principles of dissuasion and reassurance as unilateral missions
for the United States. Lind concludes with a description of the missions America’s military may be required to undertake in the execution of a concertbalance strategy.
The second thematic feature in this issue examines a number of the issues associated with the ever-increasing utilization of “Contractors on the Battlefield.” Mark Cancian’s “Contractors: The New Element of Military Force
Structure” provides readers with an in-depth analysis of the missions currently
performed by contractors, insight as to how the role of contractors has evolved,
and recommendations for the future employment of contractor personnel. The
author bases his assessment on three guiding principles: that the majority of
jobs currently performed by contractors should not be done by military personnel; provisions for bodyguards (where most problems have occurred) have viable options for change; and the restructuring (downsizing) of the military
following the Cold War makes the use of contractors a necessity, not an option.
Steven Schooner provides a rather pragmatic view of the impact contractors
have on the battlefield in “Why Contractor Fatalities Matter.” The author attempts to place the deaths of more than 1,350 contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq into a context that equates these fatalities to those of military
personnel. Schooner believes the average American does not fully appreciate
the human cost associated with contractor fatalities and injuries. He asserts
that neither the public nor the Congress can understand or influence US involvement in such conflicts without first knowing the level of the military’s reliance on contractor personnel in the war zone. The author concludes his
analysis with the declaration that the US government has increasingly delegated to the private sector both the right and responsibility to stand in harm’s
way, and if necessary, die for the country (acts previously restricted to the military profession).
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Daniel Roper warns in “Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity
for the Long War” that words have consequences, especially in the shaping of
understanding and developing potential courses of action. His message is simple and direct; America’s policy of framing its war against extremists as a “War
on Terrorism” has resulted in an erroneous paradigm for countering terrorism
and insurgencies. Not only does this policy mischaracterize the enemy, it obscures an understanding of their techniques and impedes the development and
implementation of a strategy to counter the acts of these enemies. The author
outlines a number of steps the United States should take to refocus its strategic
frame of reference to more effectively address remediating symptoms and the
deeper causes associated with such threats. Roper calls for clear thinking supported by clear language; characterized by removing the phrase “war on terrorism” from the official lexicon and replacing it with more precise and descriptive
terms. It is this clear articulation of this new strategy that will allow for the integration of all the elements of national power in the effective prosecution of
America’s national security objectives.
Our final article in this issue is William McDonough’s “Time for a New
Strategy.” The author examines the military and political strategies the United
States has employed during the past five and a half years in Iraq. He reminds
readers that as of July 2008, The New Way Forward (Surge Strategy) is coming
to an end. The author believes the Iraqi government and its security forces have
achieved many of the benchmarks and objectives outlined in that particular
strategy. McDonough states, “Now is the time to significantly reduce the US
presence in Iraq and temporarily supply the technical assistance and security
training Iraq needs to solidify the hard-earned achievements and gains of recent
years.” He warns that the real challenge is to get the drawdown of US military
forces right. How should the United States configure its forces for future military operations in Iraq? The author concludes with some broad recommendations for this new strategy.
Saying goodbye to a true friend and professional is never easy. That is
especially true when the one being farewelled is our Editorial Technician, Mrs.
Joyce Eileen Fritz. After more than 13 years of service to the journal and its readers she has decided to retire. Joyce is the last of the Parameters’ team that was
here when I assumed the editorship 11 years ago. Her tenure was characterized
by an unparalleled dedication and a willingness to accept and master any task or
challenge. She was singularly instrumental in the publication of more than 50 issues of the journal. Throughout her time with the journal Joyce was the primary
source of the technical quality and excellence responsible for the journal’s current reputation in the military publication arena. To say she will be sorely missed
by her many friends and hundreds of professional acquaintances is perhaps the
ultimate understatement. We wish for nothing but the best for Joyce, Ray, and
their entire family in retirement. — RHT
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